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WATER RIGHTS

The Seaward Boundary Cases
by Robert H. Abrams

FACTS

United States

v.
State of Louisiana
(Alabama and Mississippi Boundary Cases)
(Docket No.9, Original)

To be arguedNovember 26, 1984

United States

v.
State of Maine
(Rhode Island and New York Boundary Cases)
(Docket No. 35, Original)

To be arguedNovember 2~, 1984
ISSUE

In these cases, argued the same day but not joined,
the Supreme Court is being asked to settle the seaward
boundary of four coastal states-Alabama, Mississippi,
Rhode Island and New York. The more particular legal
question that the Court will address is the impact on that
determination of the existence of offshore barrier islands in the Gulf of Mexico, and Long Island and Block
Island off the North Atlantic coast. These cases will
interest and impact upon very few, but should clear up
some murky, technical boundary questions that may
later surface in jurisdictional disputes. If these islands
are deemed by law (as opposed to cartography or common perception) to be within bays, the outer shores of
these islands mark the coast of the states, and all water
landward of the islands are considered inland waters,
wholly within state jurisdiction and control. Waters to
the seaward side of the islands are under state jurisdiction for three miles, after which they are subject to
exclusive federal control. If instead, these islands are
found to be outside of any bays, state jurisdiction extends for three miles from the island shore. To seaward,
this resultant division ofjurisdiction is identical; to landward, however, areas of water and beds lying more than
three miles from the mainland and more than three
miles from the islands will be under federal control.

Robert H. Abrams is Associate Dean and Professor of Law at
Waylle State Law School, Detroit, M148202; telephone (313)
577-3975.
Issue No. 5

The Alabama and Mississippi cases are part of a
larger litigation that was instituted to settle the seaward
boundaries of all of the Gulf coast states. Previous litigation, terminated in 1960, fixed the Louisiana coast and
expressly left open the identical question for Alabama
and Mississippi. It was thought that the United States
and the two states could negotiate an agreement. In
1979, the state of Mississippi, having decided that the
negotiations were unlikely to reach a suitable conclusion,
filed a motion in the Supreme Court seeking entry of a
supplemental decree in the discontinued litigation. Alabama followed suit some months later. The matter was
referred to Special Master Walter P. Armstrong, Jr. in
early 1980. Roughly four years later, the Report of the
Special Master was filed, favoring the claims of the two
states. The parties noted their exceptions (legal disagreements) to the master's report, and the Supreme
Court in this case considers those exceptions.
The physical setting in the Gulf states case is one in
which there is a line of barrier islands several miles off
the mainland coast. The waterbody that lies between
these islands and the mainland is the Mississippi Sound.
The Special Master's Report explained that the 1960
decision of the Supreme Court seuling the Louisiana
boundary described the applicable method for measuring the boundaries and proceeded to apply that method
to the specifics of the case. The result favored the states
in their claim that all of the waters of the Mississippi
Sound were inland waters subject to state control.
The Rhode Island/New York case, although presenting similar legal issues, arose in a different fashion.
Pilots of foreign flag and American registry vessels licensed by the state of Connecticut challenged a Rhode
Island statute that required all vessels plying the waters
of Block Island Sound to take on a Rhode Island licensed pilot. The federal district court in that case,
Wamer v. Replinger (397 F. Supp. 350 (Dist. R. I. 1975»,
determined that the Rhode Island statute was authorized by federal statute (46 U.S.C. section 211) if the
waters of Long Island Sound and Block Island Sound
were properly considered to be "bays." The court found
that under the Geneva Convention on the Territorial
Sea and Contiguous Zone, the sounds were bays and the
Rhode Island regulation was upheld. The result was
affirmed by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit. Certiorari was sought, but the peti107
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tion was never acted upon by the Supreme Court.
The United States also pursued a separate means to
review of the determination that the waters involved
were bays. It filed a motion in pending litigation (United
States v. Maine, Docket Number 35, Original) with all of
the northeastern coastal states seeking a supplemental
determination of the coastal boundary of Rhode Island.
This motion was granted and Walter E. Hoffman was
appointed Special Master in mid-I977. Thereafter, the
Special Master formally advised the other northeastern
coastal states of the pendency of the Rhode Island
boundary determination and the likelihood that it would
settle legal issues that would affect their coastal boundaries. The state of New York eventually joined the supplemental litigation, becoming an active participant in
1981.

The physical setting of the Rhode Island/New York
case concerns the waters of Long Island Sound and
Block Island Sound. The Special Master concluded that
all of Long Island Sound and the bulk of Block Island
Sound were juridical bays within the meaning of the
Geneva Convention on Territorial Waters and Contiguous zones. As with the Gulf states case, the impact of this
determination is that the states control these waters and
the underlying beds. Additionally, Rhode Island's authority to regulate pilotage in the portions of these waters assigned to it by the master's report is implicitly
sustained.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
There seems to be no major importance to either of
these cases. The legal issue is of some general concern,
for on occasion, the control of beds and waters lying
between the mainland and offshore islands will determine the rights to mineral deposits found beneath the
coastal waters. Alaska's presence in the case as an amicus
gives some indication that the issue involved might have
important implication for offshore oil and gas development in that region. Beyond mineral rights, there are
some issues of regulatory jurisdiction that are also implicated by these cases. For example, in the Rhode Island
case, that state has claimed the right to regulate pilotage
of vessels in the disputed area. If the boundary claim
favors the state, its regulation can be sustained; if the
boundary claim fails, the regulation will be beyond the
state's authority.
The legal issues in the case are all rather technical,
involving the proper interpretation and application of
the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone to the factual settings provided by the two
cases.
ARGUMENTS-MISSISSIPPI SOUND
For the United States (Counsel of Record, Donald A. Carr,
Department of[ustice, Washington, DC 20530; telephone (202)
633-2217)

108

I. The straight baseline method of Article 4 of the Geneva Convention has not been adopted by the United
States.
2. Mississippi Sound is not ajuridical bay.
3. Dauphin Island should not be considered a part of
the mainland.
4. The Mississippi and Alabama enabling acts did not
establish the precise location of state boundaries.
5. The several states did not, on admission to the Union,
receive indefeasible title to submerged lands that
would prevent a change in governing law.

For the State of Mississippi (Counsel of Record, Jim R.
Bruce, P. O. Box 37, Kennett. MO 63857; telephone (314)
888-9696)
I. The federal government has disclaimed the use of
straight baselines in determining coastal boundaries
of the several states.
2. Mississippi Sound is inland water without regard to
the treatment of Dauphin Island as part of the mainland.
3. The Mississippi enabling act confirms that Mississippi
Sound is inland water.
4. Mississippi Sound is ajuridical bay.
5. Mississippi Sound constitutes "historic inland waters"
of the state.
For the State of Alabama (Counsel of Record, Benjamin
Cohen, Special Assistant Attorney General, 2330 Highland
Avenue South. Birmingham. AL 35205; telephone (205) 3281665)
I. The historic land boundary in the region is the seaward side of the barrier islands.
2. The eastern end of Mississippi Sound is a juridical
bay.
3. Dauphin Island is an extension of'the mainland.
AMICUS ARGUMENT
In Support of the States
The state of Alaska filed the sole amicus brief in this
case, raising the following arguments:
I. The intent of the Alaskan statehood act was to eliminate all pockets of open sea off the state's coast and
make them part of the state's territorial seas.
2. The discussion of straight baselines is not necessary to
the determination of the case.
3. The Submerged Lands Act grants to states all submerged lands between the state's most seaward contiguous boundary and the mainland.
4. The Submerged Lands Act must be viewed as an
extension of the "equal footing" doctrine, thereby
forbidding disparate treatment of Alabama and Mississippi from that accorded to Louisiana.
5. The executive branch cannot, without congressional
approval, alter a policy which effectively deprives a
state of claimed lands within the state's boundaries.
PREVIEW
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ARGUMENTS-LONG ISLAND AND
BLOCK ISLAND SOUNDS
For the United States (Counsel of Record, Margase! N. Strand,
Department of [ustice, Washington, DC 20530; telephone (202)
633-2217)

1. Long Island is not an extension of the mainland and
does not form ajuridical bay.

For the State of Rhode Island (Counsel of Record, j. Peter
Doherty, Special Assistant Attorney General, RFD Hawkseye
Farm, Sharon Sprins, NY 13459, telephone (518) 284-2147)
1. Article 7 of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial
Sea and Contiguous Zone requires that the closing
line for the Rhode Island boundary be formed by a
line between Montauk Point and Lewis Point on
Block Island and a line between Sandy Point on Block
Island and Judith Point.
2. The geographic, physical, social and economic ties
between Long Island and the mainland and the uses
of the enclosed waters between the island and the
mainland, establish Long Island as part of the mainland for the purposes of fixing seaward boundaries.
For the State of New York (Counsel of Record, Peter H.
Schiff, Acting Attorney-in-Chief, Appeals and Opinions of the
Office of the Attorney General of the State of New York, 2

Issue No. 5

World Trade Center, New York, NY 10047,' telephone (212)
488-5123)

1. Article 7 of the Geneva Convention on Territorial Sea
and the Contiguous Zone governs this case.
2. The juridical bay constituted by Long Island Sound
should include Block Island Sound and should be
closed by baselines from Montauk Point and Point
Judith to Block Island.
AMICUS ARGUMENTS
In Support ofthe States
The state of Alaska filed the sole amicus brief in this
case, raising the following arguments:
1. Division of submerged lands between coastal states
and the federal government is a matter of domestic
law which does not merit the judicial deference reserved for cases involving foreign policy.
2. The coastline of the Alexander Archipelago was the
subject of the Alaskan boundary arbitration with
Great Britain in 1903.
3. Application of the equal footing doctrine in the
simple manner proposed by the United States would
entitle all states to a nine-mile band of submerged
lands.
4. Congress, not the executive branch, has the power to
fix the coastal boundaries of states.

109

Copyright 1984 by the American Bar Association. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved. See restrictions on Scholarly Commons cover sheet Comments.

ARGUMENTS: DECEMBER SES~ION
Monday, November 26

Tuesday, November 27

Wednesday, November 28

1. United

States v, Mame et al. (35
Orig.)(Preview 107-109)
2. United States v, Louisiana et al. (9 Orig.)
(Preview 107-109)
3. Town of Hallie v, City of Eau Claire (821832)
4. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v, United States (82-1922)

5. United States v, Sharpe (83-529)
6. Bd. of License Commissioners of Town
of Tiverton v, Pastore (83-963)
7. Atkins v, Parker (83·1li60). Parker v.
Block (83·6381)
8. Central States, SE and SW Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transport. Inc.
(82-2157)

9. Francis v. Franklin (8:\-15\10)
10. United States v..Johns (83-IG25)
II. Federal Election Comm'n v. National
Conservative Political Action Committee (8:\-1032), Democratic Party of the
U.S. v, National Conservative Political
Action Committee (83-1122)
12. NAACP v, Hampton County Election
Comm'n (83·1015)

Monday, December 3

Tuesday, December 4

Wednesday, December 5

I. Cleveland Bd. of Education v, Loudermill (83-1362). Parma Bd, of Education
v. Donnelly (83-1363). Loudermill v,
Cleveland Bd. of Education (83-6392)
2. Heckler v. Chaney (83·1878)
3. Anderson v, City of Bessemer (83-1623)
4. Lindahl v, Office of Personnel Management (83-5954)

5. Wallace v. Jaffrec (83-812). Smith v, jaffree (83·929)
6. CIA v, Sims (83·1075). Sims v. CIA (831249) (83-929)
7. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v, Byrd (83·
1708)
8. Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons (83·1452)

9. School Dist, of City of Grand Rapids v.
Ball (83·990)
10.Aguilar v. Felton (84·237). Secretary, U.
S. Dept. of Education v, Fclton (84-238),
Chancellor of Bd. of Education of City
of New York v, Felton (84-239)
11. Marek v, Chesny (83· I 437)(1'rcl'iew 105·
1(6)
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